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1. Introduction 
Hayashi (1982) argues that average Q is a sufficient statistic for the firm’s 
investment opportunities under a certain set of conditions. However, many studies have 
found that cash flow variable is statistically significant in their investment equations. 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) divide their samples into two groups—those 
firms with a higher dividend and those with a lower dividend—and find that severely 
financially constrained firms react more sensitively to cash flow. They also demonstrate 
that firms are not indifferent in their use of internal and external funds in their 
investment decision. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) also divide their samples 
into groups—those firms with main banks and those without—and estimate their 
respective investment equations separately. Finding that the coefficient estimate of the 
cash flow variable for those firms with main banks is significantly smaller than the 
corresponding estimate of those firms without main banks, Hoshi et al. (1991) argue 
that main banks mitigate the asymmetric information problem and reduce the agency 
cost in lending. From this viewpoint, cash flow is an important part of internal funds, 
and the agency cost of internal funds is lower than that of external funds. The 
investment behavior by firms is then sensitive to the volume of internal funds. 
 3
However, there is some criticism against the above financing constraint 
interpretation of cash flow variable. First, Tobin’s Q, constructed using data on stock 
prices, may be a poor proxy for the future profitability of the firm, and cash flow 
variable may then pick up information of the future profitability of the firm which 
Tobin’s Q fails to capture. See, for example, Sims (1988), and Cummins, Hassett and 
Oliner (2006). The latter proposes a ‘real Q’ rather than a Tobin’s Q constructed with 
stock prices. 
Second, if we specify that the production function of a firm is subject to exogenous 
technology shocks, all three variables—investment, Tobin’s Q, and cash flow—become 
functions of technology shocks. Two difficult problems then emerge. The first is that 
both Tobin’s Q and the cash flow variables on the right-hand side of the investment 
equation become endogenous and appropriate measures should be taken to deal with 
simultaneous equations bias. The second is that since Tobin’s Q and the cash flow 
variables share the same information associated with technology shocks, the statistical 
significance of the cash flow variable does not directly imply that the firm in question is 
financially constrained. The statistical significance of the cash flow variable may then 
be simply picking up the information on technology shocks. To test whether or not the 
firm is financially constrained, it is therefore necessary to divide the sample into a 
supposedly financially constrained group of firms and a less financially constrained 
group of firms, estimate their respective investment equations, and test whether or not 
the coefficient estimates of cash flow variable are statistically different. See, Hayashi 
and Inoue (1991), and Hayashi (2000) for details. 
To absorb the information of the future profitability of a firm, which Tobin’s Q fails to 
capture, Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), and others include the sales–capital 
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ratio of a firm, in addition to Tobin’s Q and the cash flow variables, in the right-hand 
side of the investment equation, and attempt to interpret the cash flow variable as a 
financing constraint. However, as Hall (1988) correctly points out, the causality between 
the sales of a firm and its investment is both ways and the sales–capital ratio is 
endogenous. 
In this paper, we confine ourselves to the investment behavior of unlisted automobile 
parts suppliers, and propose to use a better instrument—the sales of large automobile 
makers—to control for the future profitability of a firm. The sales of large automakers is 
exogenous to auto suppliers, and adding this exogenous demand variable to the 
right-hand side of the investment equation makes it easier to interpret the cash flow 
variable as a financing constraint. 
Indeed, we find that addition of the sales–capital ratio of large automakers to the 
right-hand side of the investment equation of suppliers makes the t-value of Tobin’s Q 
smaller, while throughout our empirical investigation it keeps the t-value of cash flow 
virtually unchanged. This finding at least suggests the cash flow variable plays the role 
of a financing constraint in the investment equation. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we provide some 
preliminary observations on our sample, and present some intuition on the issue using 
our sample. In Section 3, we explain our baseline investment equation to estimate and 
report our statistical results. To reconfirm our results, we extend our baseline model to 
switching regression models and report our statistical evidence in Section 4. In Section 
5, we summarize the contributions of this paper. 
 
2. Some Casual Observations 
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Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of annual data on the ratio of the amount 
of investment to that of cash flow for Japanese unlisted automobile parts suppliers over 
the period 1975 to 2004. The total number of observations is 1,260. 
[ Figure 1 around here ] 
If the ratio of the amount of investment to that of cash flow is less than one, we 
might roughly take it as indicating that the firm in question makes investment within 
the limit of internal funds. Stiglitz (1988) also points out that if the firm is facing a 
financing constraint, the amount of investment is expected to cluster around the 
financing constraint. Of course, there might be cases in reality where firms just happen 
to undertake investment within the limits of internal funds, not because firms face 
financing constraints, but because firms foresee the lack of future demand for their 
products. In addition, there may be other cases where firms happen to hold other liquid 
assets other than cash flow and use these for investment. Therefore, we need to be 
careful about interpreting the ratio of the amount of investment to that of cash flow. 
However, if the ratio of a firm is far from one, we may take it as indicating that the firm 
is not facing financing constraints. 
Figure 1 shows that more than 60% of the sample falls within the range of 0.5 and 
1.5 of the investment–cash flow ratio. This suggests that many firms may be facing 
some financing constraints. We now turn to the more formal analysis in the remaining 
sections. 
 
3. Baseline Investment Equation 
Under the assumption of perfect competition, constant returns, and capital as the 
only quasi-fixed factor, Hayashi (1982) finds that marginal Q equals average Q (the 
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ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of the capital stock) and 
that average Q is a sufficient statistic for the firm’s investment opportunities. When 
cash flow variable is added to the investment equation in empirical work, however, its 
coefficient is found to be almost always significant. 
There are two competing hypotheses for this empirical finding. The first hypothesis 
is that cash flow captures information on the future probability of each firm which 
average Q fails to explain. The second hypothesis is that cash flow is a source of internal 
funds, and that the price of internal funds differs from external funds due to 
imperfections in the capital market. Cash flow then represents the degree of tightness 
in the financial constraints firms face. 
Many studies, including Fazzari et al. (1988, 1996), Hoshi et al. (1991), added the 
sales–capital ratio to the investment equation to control for the future profitability of a 
firm. As Hall (1988) correctly points out, however, the sales–capital ratio is endogenous 
in the investment equation, which may introduce a simultaneous equation bias in 
estimation. To avoid this simultaneous equation bias, we choose a sample of unlisted 
companies which supply parts of automobiles to large automobile makers, and 
investigate whether their cash flow variable represents a true financial constraint or 
merely captures future profitability unexplained by Tobin’s Q. We select this particular 
group of parts suppliers in the auto industry because the sales of large automobile 
makers captures information on the future profitability of parts suppliers, while the 
sales of large automobile makers is unaffected by the investment decisions of parts 
suppliers. That is, the amount of sales for large automakers is exogenous to the 
investment decision of parts suppliers. Our base line equation is: 
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Subscript i,t denotes firm i at time t. I , Q , CF , K  denote investment, Tobin’s Q, 
cash flow, and capital stock, respectively. (i=1,2,…,N, t=1,2,…,T). AS  and AK  are the 
sales and capital stocks of large automobile companies, respectively, to which each firm 
supplies its products. Equation (3.1) is standard except for the fourth term on the 
right-hand side. 
Most authors use the stock price of each firm to construct data on Tobin’s Q, but we 
do not. We adopt a different approach. See subsection 2 of Appendix 1 for the data 
construction of marginal Q. 
In general, the smaller the size of the firm, the greater the probability that the firm 
is financially constrained ceteris paribus, because the smaller firm is more likely to 
have smaller assets and thus lower collateral. All of our samples consist of unlisted 
small firms, and so are suitable for testing whether or not firms face financial 
constraints. In addition, note that we cannot use stock price data, because our sample 
comprises unlisted firms. 
We use the one-year lagged cash flow to avoid the simultaneous equation bias 
problem. Polk and Sapienza (2004) also employed the one-year lagged cash flow. 
In the fixed effects model, we estimate the following equation: 
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where iablessidehandrightotherE ii var[ −= αμ ], and iiiv μα −= are 
independently and identically distributed random variables with mean zero and 
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variance 2υσ . iv , and tiu ,  are assumed to be uncorrelated. We apply ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to equation (3.2) with N-1 individual effect dummy variables. This 
estimator is called the fixed effects estimator (FEE). It is well known that FEE 
numerically equals the within-group estimator (WGE). See, for example, Arellano (2003, 
pp. 14–18). We use WGE throughout the paper unless otherwise stated.1 We call 
equation (3.2) our baseline equation. 
As for variable ( AKAS / ), we consider two alternative versions ASK and 2ASK  
because of the following reasons. We use the ratio of the amount of sales of an 
automaker in real terms to the book value of the total tangible assets (excluding land) at 
the beginning of the period as a variable representing demand for the product. When an 
automaker is reported in “Kaisha Soukan (Unlisted Firm Version)”, we simply take the 
AS–AK ratio of that maker. When multiple automakers are reported, we take the 
simple average of the ratios. Variable ASK  denotes the averaged ratios. Variable 2ASK  
denotes the ratio of the single most important automaker. When we cannot identify 
which automaker is the single most important, we use the averaged ratios, even in 
variable 2ASK . 
In this industry, the relationship between parts suppliers and automakers is 
sometimes that of a pyramid type with three stories. The bottommost parts suppliers 
supply their products to the middlemost parts suppliers (“Denso” is one such middle 
parts supplier), and the middlemost parts suppliers in turn sell their intermediate 
goods to automakers (for example, “Toyota”). In such a case, we take the sales–capital 
ratio of automakers of final goods. 
Since there are many missing data in the sample, we use an unbalanced panel 
estimation method. As a result, it is difficult to include time dummy variables to capture 
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the typical booms and slumps of business cycles. However, recall that Within-Group 
Estimation numerically equals OLS applied to data in deviations-from-time-means. 
Hence, variable ASK  or 2ASK  in deviations-from-time-means picks up the 
information on the booms and slumps of business cycles, and plays a similar role to time 
dummy variables. 
In the estimation, we have discarded outliers with extreme values exceeding ± five 
standard deviations from the mean in any component throughout the paper, to obtain 
robust estimates. 
Table 1 reports the estimates of our baseline equation. 
[Table 1 around here] 
In Table 1, the comparison of column (5) with column (6) or column (7) shows that the 
t-values of cash flow CFK  are virtually unchanged when the demand variable ASK  
or 2ASK  is included, while the t-value of Q  falls from 8.60 to 7.56 in column (6) or 
7.59 in column (7). All of these results suggest that variable cash flow CFK  has some 
information content completely independent of the demand for the product or the future 
profitability of the firm. This does not conflict with the hypothesis that the cash flow 
variable represents the financial constraints of the firm. 
Some may argue that the installment of newer, more efficient machines certainly 
increases the profitability of a firm, and that Tobin’s Q is endogenous in equation (3.2). 
To cope with this criticism, we estimated the same equation (3.2) with Tobin’s Q 
replaced with the one-period-lagged Tobin’s Q. The resulting estimates are reported in 
Table 2. 
[Table 2 around here] 
Although the coefficient estimates in Table 2 are somewhat different from those in Table 
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1, the central message remains the same.2 That is, the addition of the demand variables 
ASK  or 2ASK does not lower the t-value of the cash flow variableCFK , but does lower 
the t-value of the lagged value of Tobin’s Q. The estimated results with the data 
including lagged Tobin’s Q also suggests that cash flow works as a financing constraint. 
 
4. Switching Regression Models 
To check the robustness of the findings in the previous section, we take a different 
approach. Following Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), we use switching regression models. 
We take into account the possibility that those firms that are more financially 
constrained may behave differently from those which are less constrained. 
Although Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) select a set of balance sheet variables as an 
indicator of financial strength, these variables are not necessarily available for 
Japanese unlisted firms. Rather, we select two variables as an indicator of financial 
strength: the lag of total assets at the beginning of the period )1(−LK , and a dummy 
variable, B , indicating whether the firm in question has issued corporate bonds. 
Variable B  takes a value of one when the firm issued bonds in the past, and zero 
otherwise. Those firms which issued corporate bonds in the past, ceteris paribus, are 
expected to have greater credibility and more likely to be less financially constrained. 
Thirty-eight firms of a total of 82 are found to have issued corporate bonds in the past. 
For variable )1(−LK , the larger total assets, ceteris paribus, the greater the credibility 
of the firm. 
Making use of these indicator variables, we break the sample into two groups: a 
more financially constrained group and a less financially constrained group. We can 
actually test whether or not this breakup of the sample into two groups is appropriate. 
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The switching regression model is as follows. 
     Regime 1: ticti
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where ]),/(,[ 1,1,,, ttitititi ASKKCFQX −−=  and 1/ −= ttt AKASASK  (version 1). 
     Indicator Equation: tititi Zy ,,
*
, εθ += ,                                     (4.3) 
where ]1,[ 1,, −= titi LKZ                                                        (4.4) 
or ],[ ,1,, tititi BLKZ −= ,                                                        (4.5) 
where 1, −tiLK  denotes the log of total assets of firm i at the beginning of the period t, 
tiB ,  is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when firm i issued bonds in the 
past, and zero otherwise, cβ , ucβ , θ  are vectors of corresponding parameters. tiu ,,1 , 
tiu ,,2 , and ti,ε  are error terms. 
When firm i has the smaller amount of total assets, the value of 1, −tiLK  in (4.4) 
becomes smaller. Assuming that the coefficient of the variable 1, −tiLK  is positive, a 
smaller value of 1, −tiLK  in (4.3) leads to a smaller value of
*
,tiy . Although 
*
,tiy  also 
depends on the random variable ti,ε , the smaller value of 1, −tiLK  tends to increase the 
probability that an inequality 0*, <tiy  holds. Therefore, the smaller value of 1, −tiLK  is 
associated with the tendency for the sample to fall into Regime 1 in (4.1). Parameter cβ  
then denotes the parameter of those firms that are more likely to be financially 
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constrained; ucβ  in equation (4.2) is the parameter of those firms that are less likely to 
be constrained. 
We consider two versions of the indicator equations. The first version is equation 
(4.4), which includes the log of total assets and a constant. The second version is 
equation (4.5), which includes both total assets LK  and the bond dummy variable B . 
Firms that issued bonds in the past are likely to have greater credibility when 
borrowing, and less likely to be financially constrained. 
We assume that the vector of error terms in the investment and indicator equations 
'
,,,2,,1 ),,( tititi uu ε  is jointly normally independently distributed with mean zero and 
covariance matrix Σ , where: 
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With the assumption of the joint normality of error terms, we estimate the above model 
(4.1) through (4.5) by maximum likelihood estimation. 
The probability that sample ( 1,, / −titi KI ) falls into Regime 1 is given by: 
     )Z(obPr)y(obPr t,it,i
*
t,i 00 <+=< εθ  
)Z(obPr t,it,i θε −<=  
)( , θtiZ−Φ= .                                             (4.6) 
The probability that ( 1,, / −titi KI ) falls into Regime 2 is given by:  
     )0Z(obPr)0y(obPr t,it,i
*
t,i ≥+=≥ εθ  
)Z(obPr t,it,i θε −≥=  
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)Z(1 t,i θΦ −−= .                                          (4.7) 
The likelihood function for each observation til ,  is a weighted conditional density 
function of tiu ,,1  and tiu ,,2  with weights )Z(obPr t,it,i θε −<  and )Z(obPr t,it,i θε −≥ . 
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where )(⋅φ  and )(⋅Φ  denote the normal density and the cumulative distribution 
functions, respectively. )|( ,, ⋅tijuφ  for j=1,2 is the conditional density and ),( ,, jtiju σφ  
for j=1,2 is the marginal density. The second equality sign is due to Hu and Schiantarelli 
(1998, pp. 470), who use bivariate normal properties and the fact that a joint density 
equals the product of the conditional density and the marginal density. 
For a panel of N firms with iT  observations for firm i, the log-likelihood function 
for all observations is given by: 
     ∑∑
= =
=
N
i
T
t
ti
i
lL
1 1
, )log( .                                                      (4.9)  
We maximize equation (4.9) with respect to the parameters cβ , ucβ , θ , and Σ . 
We may also obtain an estimate of the probability that each observation falls either 
into Regime 1 or Regime 2. The ex ante probability does not take into account the 
information about investment, ( 1,, / −titi KI ), and is simply given by either 
 14
)0y(obPr *t,i <  in (4.6) or )0y(obPr *t,i ≥  in (4.7). Given the information of ( 1,, / −titi KI ), 
the ex post probability takes this information into account and updates the ex ante 
probability according to Bayes’ rule. Hu and Schiantarelli show that the ex post 
probability that the observation ( 1,, / −titi KI ) falls into Regime 2 is given by: 
BA
B))K/I(|Z(obPr 1t,it,it,it,i +=−≥ −θε ,                                 (4.9) 
        where )()|( ,,,,,1 θθεφ titititi ZZuA −Φ−<=  and 
            )](1)[|( ,,,,,2 θθεφ titititi ZZuB −Φ−−≥= .  
Table 3 reports the estimates of the switching regression model (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), and 
(4.4), where we use the current Q variable in the right-hand side of regression equations 
(4.1) and (4.2), and the log of total assets of firm i, at the beginning of the period t, 
1, −tiLK , and a constant in the right-hand side of indicator function (4.4). Panel A in 
Table 3 shows the estimates in the case including only the cash flow variable, CF , with 
Tobin’s Q in the right-hand side of regression equations (4.1) and (4.2), while Panel B 
provides estimates in the case where the cash flow variable, CF , and the demand for 
the product, ASK , are included with Tobin’s Q. 
[Table 3 around here] 
First, the larger the total firm assets, the more credible the firm is as a borrower, 
because larger firms, ceteris paribus, tend to be older, more diversified, less prone to 
bankruptcy, with greater collateral, and a better known track record. Table 3 shows that 
the estimates of the coefficient of variable )1(−LK  are both positive and significant, 
indicating that Regime 2 is more likely to occur when the total assets of a firm are large. 
Hu and Schiantarelli (1998, pp. 471–473) essentially obtained a negative sign on 
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the estimates of the size of the firm, a result opposite to that found in this analysis. We 
argue that this difference comes from the nature of the samples used: namely, all firms 
in Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) are listed firms, while the firms in the present study are 
unlisted. One reason why we obtained a positive sign on the estimate of the 
coefficient )1(−LK , as against Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), is because unlisted firms are 
truly small, and more likely to face severe agency and information problems. 
In Table 3A, the coefficient estimate of the cash flow variable, 0.92, in Regime 1 is 
much larger than the corresponding estimate, 0.12, in Regime 2. The t-value of cash 
flow variable, 5.2, in Regime 1 is also much higher than the corresponding t-value, 2.5, 
in Regime 2. Firms belonging to Regime 1 are those whose total assets are smaller, and 
accordingly they react more sensitively to the cash flow variable. 
Second, when we add the demand variable ASK  to the right-hand sides of 
regression equations (4.1) and (4.2), we obtain the estimates in Table 3B. A comparison 
of the respective coefficient estimates between panels A and B shows that the addition 
of the demand variable ASK  has little effect on the t-values of the cash flow 
variableCF , although it greatly reduces the t-values for Tobin’s Q. This suggests that 
variable ASK  picks up information on the future profitability of the firm that variable 
Tobin’s Q fails to capture, and that cash flow variable CF  has independent 
information on the demand variable or information on the financing constraint. With 
respect to robustness, throughout the empirical results, the t-values of the cash flow 
variable are virtually unchanged by the addition of the demand variable ASK  to the 
right-hand sides in regression equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
To guard against a criticism that the Tobin’s Q variable is endogenous, we replace 
Tobin’s Q variable by its one-year-lagged values, and obtain Table 4. 
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[Table 4 around here] 
Although the respective coefficient estimates are affected by the replacement of 
Tobin’s Q with its lagged value, our main findings remain unaffected. First, the t-values 
of the cash flow variable in Regime 1 are higher than the corresponding t-values in 
Regime 2, suggesting that the investment behavior of those firms that are more 
financially constrained is greatly affected by the cash flow variable. Second, the 
addition of the demand variable ASK to the investment equation changes virtually 
nothing in the t-values of the cash flow variable, suggesting that the cash flow variable 
has an independent piece of information on the demand variable, or the information on 
the financing constraint. 
[Table 5 and 6 around here] 
Table 5 reports the estimates of the switching regression model with the indicator 
equation (4.4) replaced by (4.5). Table 6 is then the same as Table 5 except that Tobin’s 
Q is replaced by its one-year lagged variable. 
In Tables 5 and 6, we find that all of our estimates on the coefficient of variable B 
display a positive sign, suggesting that firms that issued bonds in the past tend to have 
the larger value of *t,iy  in equation (4.3). Therefore, these firms are more likely to fall 
into Regime 2 in equation (4.2). 
Although the estimates vary slightly depending upon the model specification, our 
main results stand solid throughout Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. First, the investment is 
significantly affected by the cash flow variable in Regime 1, where firms are more 
financially constrained, but less affected by the cash flow variable in Regime 2, where 
firms are less financially constrained. Second, the addition of the demand variable to 
the investment equation does not reduce the significance of the t-values of the cash flow 
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variable, suggesting that the cash flow variable contains a piece of information 
independent of the future profitability of the firm. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
When we include cash flow, profits, or other internal fund variables on the 
right-hand side of the corporate investment equation, we almost always find that these 
variables are statistically significant. Fazzari et al. (1988), among others, argue that 
this statistical significance is evidence that internal funds affect investment as a 
binding constraint. However, there are alternative interpretations on the significance of 
the internal fund variables. First, Cooper and Ejarque (2001) argue that allowing the 
profit function at the firm level to be strictly concave reflecting, for example, market 
power, is sufficient to replicate Q theory-based regression results where profits are a 
significant variable affecting investment. 
Second, as shown by Hayashi (1982), average Q equals marginal Q only under select 
conditions. In addition, the market value of the firm equals its stock price only if the 
stock market is efficient. None of these conditions are likely to hold. There is always 
then the potential for measurement error in the variable Q. See, for example, Erickson 
and Whited (2000). Because of errors in measuring marginal Q, we may find that 
investment by financially constrained firms responds strongly to cash flow. 
Third, there is the possibility that our econometric specification may be incorrect, 
which may wrongly lead to the statistical significance of the cash flow variable. Both 
Tobin’s Q and cash flow variable in the right-hand side of the investment equation are 
endogenous. Applying ordinary least squares and using the current values of these 
variables may then introduce a simultaneous equation bias to the resulting parameter 
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estimates. There is also reason to believe that the investment function is nonlinear. See, 
for example, Abel and Eberly (1994), Barnett and Sakellaris (1998), and Honda and 
Suzuki (2000). The linear specification included in this analysis may then also 
potentially introduce serious bias in the resulting estimates. 
We do not suggest that we have presented conclusive statistical evidence that these 
alternative interpretations are incorrect; rather we argue that our statistical results do 
not disagree with the financial constraint hypothesis of cash flow. First, recall that we 
have collected our sample only from automobile parts suppliers. Since they supply parts 
to large automobile makers such as Toyota, they are unlikely to be able to exert market 
power, contrary to the postulation in Cooper and Ejarque (2001). In addition, earlier 
work investigates the case of listed firms. However, it is questionable whether these 
studies have appropriately addressed the question because listed firms tend to be large 
and may be less likely to be financially constrained. Contrary to this literature, our 
sample consists of smaller unlisted firms. These should be more appropriate for testing 
purposes. 
Second, most empirical studies make use of stock prices as a proxy for the market 
value of the firm. Since all of the firms in our sample are unlisted, stock prices are not 
available. We use a different proxy for the market value of the firm from the standard 
literature, and obtain statistical evidence that does not disagree with the financial 
constraint hypothesis. Our findings then add yet another piece of evidence to support 
the financial constraint hypothesis. In addition, the results in this analysis are robust 
with respect to changes in the proxy for Tobin’s Q. This implies that our supportive 
evidence for the financial constraint hypothesis is robust, not only to changes in the 
proxy variables, but also against the criticism of possible simultaneous equation bias. 
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Finally, we also estimated switching regression models and found that our main 
findings are robust, suggesting that our results hold even in nonlinear specifications. 
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Appendix 1. Data Construction 
1. Data Source 
The sample data are selected from the financial statements of 82 unlisted 
corporations that produce automobile parts. These data are compiled by Tokyo Shoko 
Research (TSR). The Kaisha-Sokan (Corporation-List) is used to identify automobile 
parts suppliers. We attempted to include all suppliers; however, the TSR database fails 
to cover some firms. Our final sample comprises 82 corporations. 
The potential sample period is from 1974 to 2004, or 31 years. However, there are 
few firms that cover the entire sample period. Indeed there are only 28 corporations 
that have more than 15-year consecutive data. Even when they have more than 15 
years of data, at least some lack a few years. For example, some firms have data from 
1974 to 1985 and from 1987 to 2004, but lack data for 1986. Others have data from 1975 
to 1996 and from 1998 to 2004, but lack data for 1997. Therefore, we are obliged to 
employ an unbalanced panel of data. 
The fact that most of our sample consists of data with missing observations hampers 
use of the perpetual inventory method as in Hoshi and Kashyap (1990) and Hayashi 
and Inoue (1991), and poses some difficulties in the construction of data on the 
replacement cost of capital stock, a necessary component to obtain data on marginal Q. 
Hence, we follow Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Carpenter and Petersen (2002), and Polk 
and Sapienza (2006) and use the book value of nominal capital stock or total assets. 
2. Marginal Q 
Under the assumptions of constant returns-to-scale and perfect competition, we can 
derive marginal tQ  as: 
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Following Hayashi (2000), we define gross profit tπ  as )1( tt τπ −= × operating 
income + depreciation, where tτ  denotes the corporate tax rate at time t. 
Because our sample consists of unlisted firms, we calculate the cost of capital 
( δ+tr ) as δρτδ +−=+ tttr )1( , where tρ , tτ , and δ  is the rate of return on 
ten-year government bonds, the corporate tax rate, and the depreciation rate, 
respectively. Data on tρ  and tτ  are the same across firms, but not δ . Accordingly, 
we calculate the depreciation rate as the sample average of each firm over time. 
As for 1,, −titK Kp , we use the book value of capital stock.  
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3. Corporate Investment 
We improve the method of data construction on investment. All previous studies, 
including Hayashi and Inoue (1991), constructed the investment data based on the 
definition: 
HII  = Current Installed Capital Investment 
    = Tangible Fixed Assets at time t 
－ Tangible Fixed Assets at time (t-1) 
＋ Depreciation, 
where Tangible Fixed Assets are defined as the sum of Building, Structures, Machinery 
and Equipment, Tools, Furniture and Fixtures, and Vehicles and Other Transportation 
Equipment. 
However, the true current capital expenditure, denoted by I , should be defined as: 
I  = Current Capital Expenditure 
        = Current Capital Expenditure booked under the account of Tangible Fixed 
Assets 
          ＋ Current Capital Expenditure booked under the account of Construction in 
Progress. 
Therefore, the true Current Capital Expenditure should be: 
     I  = HII   
           － Transfer from Construction in Progress to Tangible Fixed Assets 
           ＋ Current Capital Expenditure booked under the account of Construction 
in Progress 
       = HII  ＋  Account of Construction in Progress at time t －  Account of 
Construction in Progress at time (t-1). 
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In the present paper, we use I  instead of HII  as the data on investment.  
Finally, in this section, we keep a record on how we handled those exceptional firms 
that switched accounting periods during the sample period. For illustrative purposes, 
suppose that a firm in question switched its accounting period from January 1 to 
December 31, 1996 to April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997. If data on March 1996 are 
available, Investment I at year 1996 should be defined as: 
I (1996) 
= Tangible Fixed Assets at March 1997 
＋ Account of Construction in Progress at March 1997 
－ Tangible Fixed Assets at March 1996  
－ Account of Construction in Progress at March 1996 
＋ Depreciation for the period from April 1996 to March 1997. 
However, March 1996 data are, in fact, unavailable for some firms. Therefore, we define 
Investment at year 1996 as follows. 
     I (1996) 
= Tangible Fixed Assets at March 1997 
＋ Account of Construction in Progress at March 1997 
－ Tangible Fixed Assets at December 1995 
－ Account of Construction in Progress at December 1995 
＋ Depreciation for the period from April 1996 to March 1997. 
For those firms whose data are available for Depreciation for the period January 1996 
to March 1996, we added it to the value of Depreciation from April 1996 to March 1997. 
4. Cash Flow 
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We define Cash Flow as the sum of Depreciation and Net Income after Income Taxes. 
The cash flow rate at time t, tCF , is the ratio of the one-year lagged Cash Flow to the 
one-year lagged book value of the total tangible assets (excluding land). Our definition 
of Cash Flow includes dividends because firms are assumed to make decisions on real 
investment first, and then formulate dividend policy. This follows suggestions by 
Fazzari et al. (1988). As in Polk and Sapienza (2006), we use the one-year lagged Cash 
Flow in tCF  to avoid the simultaneous equation bias problem. 
5. Capital Stock 
We use the book value of total tangible assets excluding land as capital stock K . 
Because the absolute value of K  is extremely large for large automobile makers such 
as Toyota, we divide K  by 106 for large auto makers, which specifies the unit of 
measurement as a billion yen. To obtain the data LK  in (4.4) or (4.5), we simply take 
the natural logarithm of K . 
 
Appendix 2. Firms Included in Samples 
Corporation             Periods Included in Samples 
Gunma Seiki        1992–1998  2001–2004 
Chiyoda Seisakusho     1981–2004 
Shoda Seisakusho       1986–1990  1996–2004 
Sakamoto Kougyo       1974–1985  1995–1997 
Kurita Arumi Kougyo    2002–2004 
Mie Giken Kougyo       1974–2003 
Seiken Kagaku Kougyo   1974–1984  1998–2004 
Kiipar                   1974–2004 
Nihon Bureki Kougyo     1987–1989 
Nihon Thermostat        1980–1982  1988–1999 
Mets                     1976–1987 
Nihon Wiper Bureido      1974–1992 
T Estick                  1977–2004 
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Asumo                   1975–2004 
Ho Seimitsu Kougyo      1974–1976  1983–1984  1987–1992  1995–2004 
Yanagawa Seiki          1974–2004 
TGK                     1975–1983  1985–1998  2002–2004 
Oi seisakusho            1991–2002 
Waizu                   2000–2004 
Yokohama Kikou         1980–2004 
Techno Hirata            1977–1986  1990–1993  1998–2004 
Central Jidousha         1975–2004 
Horie Kinzoku Kougyo    1987–1989  1991–1995 
Yajima                   1986–2001 
Aishin Kakou            1975–2004 
Matsukawa Tekkosho     1974–1989 
Sango                   1991–2001 
Ogasawara Kougyo       1986–1988  1997–1999 
Izumi Kougyo            1977–2004 
Arakawa Kougyo         1992–2003 
Chuo Seiki               1974–2004 
Shimizu Kougyo          1982–1990  1994–2004 
Ohashi Tekkou           1974–1994  1998–2003 
Aichi Kikou              1984–1987  1990–1991  1993–1999 
Ohara Jushi Kougyo      1975–1996  1998–2004 
Ansei                    1974–1985  1987–2004 
Aishin Koukyu           1983–1989 
Kyohô Seisakusho        1974–1987  1993–1994  1998–2004 
Yahagi Sangyo           1975–1989  1991–2001 
NT Techno               1997–2003 
Kyowa Sangyo           1977–1980  1982–2004 
Sindai                   1974–2004 
Tsuda Kougyo            1985–1990  1999–2004 
Aishin Kikou             1989–1990  1993–2003 
Aichi Hikaku Kougyo     1982–1988 
Fuji Press                1975–1981 
Housei Bureki Kougyo    1975–1987  1991–1993  1996–2003 
Kotobuki Giken Kougyo   2000–2004 
GS Eletech               1982–2002 
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Jounan Seisakusho       1986–2004 
Totsuku Seisakusho       1977–1988  1990–1994  1996–1998  2000–2002 
Asama Giken Kougyo     2000–2004 
NE                      1986–1988  1991–2000 
Shizuoka Denso          1993–1997 
Usui Kokusai Sangyo     1975–1983  1985–2003 
Biyonzu                 1982–2004 
Kanae Kougyo             1985–1987  1995–2004 
Toyo Densan              1980–1992  1995–2004 
Enkei                     1978–1986  1988–1998 
Kaneda Kougyo            1977–1982 
Katsuyama Fain Tech      1977–2004 
Tokai Seiko                1975–1989 
Rizumu                   1985–1989 
Pajero Seizou              1985–1995 
Gifu Shatai Kougyo        1983–1985 
Tokitsu Sangyo            1988–2000 
Asahi Forji                1992–2003 
Shinnichi Kougyo          1999–2004 
Kokusan Buhin Kougyo    1981–1985  1989–1994  1996–1997 1999–2004 
Aoi Kikai Kougyo          1982–1987  1993–2003 
Tsukiboshi Seisakusho      1978–2003 
Nisshin Seisakusho         2001–2004 
Heian Seisakusho          1989–2003 
Mie Kougyo                1977–1979  1981–1986  1991–1994  1998–2003 
Takao Kinzoku Kougyo     1977 1982  1984–1995  2000–2003 
Asahi Aluminium          1978–1990  1992–1999  2001–2004 
Sanyo Haidorikku Kougyo  1993–1995  2001–2003 
Souja Kougyo              1977–1979  1995–2004 
Sanjyo Kougyo             1975–1983  1985–2004 
Mizushima Kikou           1977–1979  1994–2004 
Ihara Seiki                 1997–2004 
Yoshiwa Kougyo            1981–1988  1999–2004 
 
Footnote 
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1. An obvious alternative estimator is the generalized method of moments (GMM). 
However, our sample contains many missing observations, and the use of lagged data as 
an instrument in GMM makes the samples too small to obtain reliable estimates. For 
example, if we include a two period-lagged variable as an instrument in GMM 
estimation, we cannot use the sample with observation data available at t and t-1, but 
missing at t-2. The sample includes many such missing values. 
2. The comparison of Table 2 with Table 1 shows that the replacement of Tobin’s Q by its 
lagged value makes the t-values of cash flow variable CFK smaller. We interpret this as 
follows. We use one-period lagged value of cash flow for data CFK, and the use of the 
lagged Tobin’s Q instead of the current Tobin’s Q makes the correlation between the two 
variables higher. The higher correlation between the lagged Tobin’s Q and CFK in turn 
makes the t-values of CFK smaller. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Frequency Distribution of Investment / Cash Flow Ratio 
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Note. This graph shows the frequency distribution of the ratio of 
corporate investment to cash flow. 
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Tables 
Table 1 Estimates of the Investment Equation (WITHIN) 
Current Q model : Dependent Variable = 
1,
,
−ti
ti
K
I  
 (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6)       (7) 
     Q         0.1810                                0.1473   0.1303   0.1310 
(12.120)                               (8.597)   (7.560)   (7.591) 
    CFK                  0.6316                     0.3267   0.3165   0.3178 
                          (9.755)                     (4.595)   (4.539)   (4.547) 
    ASK                           0.0290                     0.0158 
                                   (8.316)                     (5.080) 
    ASK2                                   0.0279                     0.0146 
                                            (8.088)                     (4.733) 
    Adjusted 
    R-squared   0.1762   0.1070   0.0663   0.0630   0.1981   0.2153   0.2131 
    Observations = 1260 
Note. Numbers in parentheses denote t-values based on 
heteroskedastic– consistent standard errors. 
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Table 2 Estimates of the Investment Equation (WITHIN) 
         Lagged Q model : Dependent Variable = 
1,
,
−ti
ti
K
I  
 (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)       (6)       (7) 
    Q(-1)       0.1537                                0.1195   0.0976   0.0986 
(10.818)                               (5.245)   (4.256)   (4.313) 
    CFK                  0.6194                     0.2075   0.2161   0.2101 
                          (8.685)                     (1.834)   (1.953)   (1.886) 
    ASK                           0.0304                     0.0212 
                                   (8.074)                     (5.908) 
    ASK2                                   0.0297                     0.0203 
                                            (7.983)                     (5.691) 
    Adjusted 
    R-squared   0.1258   0.0977   0.0680   0.0668   0.1298   0.1598   0.1580 
    Observations = 1131  
Note. Numbers in parentheses denote t-values based on   
heteroskedastic– consistent standard errors. 
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Table 3 Estimates of the Switching Regression Model 
Current Q model : ]),1([, ALKZ ti −=  
     A. Without Demand Variable ASK 
 Number of observations=1260  Log likelihood=496.372  Schwarz B.I.C.=－460.678 
( investment equation )  
                         regime 1                     regime 2  
 Q               0.1360  (4.463)              0.1466  (14.055) 
 CF                0.9171  (5.207)             0.1182   (2.478) 
 iσ                 0.2814  (21.338)            0.1331  (23.194) 
 εσ ,i                －0.1077 (5.428)             －0.0869 (5.666) 
 ex post probability     0.2101                    0.7899 
 ( switching equation ) 
  )1(−LK              0.2414  (3.024) 
 A                                0.6395  (5.804) 
 
     B. With Demand Variable ASK 
 Number of observations=1260  Log likelihood=512.353  Schwarz B.I.C.=－469.520 
( investment equation )  
                         regime 1                     regime 2  
 Q               0.1234  (4.053)              0.1282  (11.743) 
 CF                0.8020  (4.969)             0.1175   (2.431) 
 ASK                  0.0199  (1.741)             0.0131   (4.884) 
iσ                 0.2721  (23.353)            0.1294   (21.744) 
 εσ ,i                －0.1013  (5.224)            －0.0864  (5.923) 
 ex post probability     0.2372                    0.7628 
 ( switching equation ) 
  )1(−LK              0.2684  (3.347) 
 A                                0.5310  (4.798) 
 
Notes. A is a constant, ‘ex post probability’ refers to the estimate of the 
ex post probability that each observation falls into Regime 1 or 2 
given the information on investment value.  
 32
Table 4 Estimates of the Switching Regression Model  
Lagged Q model : ]),1([, ALKZ ti −=  
     A. Without Demand Variable ASK 
 Number of observations=1131  Log likelihood=399.851  Schwarz B.I.C.=－364.697 
( investment equation )  
                         regime 1                     regime 2  
 )1(−Q            0.0174  (0.283)              0.1398  (8.534) 
 CF                0.9135  (3.340)             －0.0358  (0.492) 
 iσ                 0.3085  (17.249)            0.1335  (21.875) 
 εσ ,i                －0.0940 (4.124)             －0.0773 (4.671) 
 ex post probability     0.2097                    0.7903 
 ( switching equation ) 
  )1(−LK              0.2509  (2.910) 
 A                                0.6363  (5.058) 
 
     B. With Demand Variable ASK 
 Number of observations=1131  Log likelihood=426.024  Schwarz B.I.C.=－383.839 
( investment equation )  
                         regime 1                     regime 2  
 )1(−Q              0.0113  (0.215)              0.1166  (6.912) 
 CF                0.8581  (3.694)             －0.0358  (0.479) 
 ASK                  0.0207  (1.797)             0.0205   (6.777) 
iσ                 0.2917  (19.958)            0.1262   (20.833) 
 εσ ,i               －0.0867  (4.256)            －0.0759  (5.204) 
 ex post probability     0.2475                     0.7525 
 ( switching equation ) 
  )1(−LK              0.2990  (3.538) 
 A                                0.4796  (3.972) 
 
Notes. A is a constant, ‘ex post probability’ refers to the estimate of the 
ex post probability that each observation falls into Regime 1 or 2 
given information on its investment value.  
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Table 5 Estimates of the Switching Regression Model  
Current Q model : ]),1([, BONDLKZ ti −=  
     A. Without Demand Variable ASK 
 Number of observations=1260  Log likelihood=489.319  Schwarz B.I.C.=－453.625 
( investment equation )  
                          regime 1                     regime 2  
 Q                0.1584  (7.742)              0.1294  (10.959) 
 CF                0.6283  (5.754)              0.1118   (2.116) 
 iσ                 0.2476  (33.318)             0.1231  (21.221) 
 εσ ,i               －0.0946  (5.494)            －0.0858  (7.550) 
 ex post probability     0.3600                      0.6400 
 ( switching equation ) 
  )1(−LK              0.2061  (2.814) 
 BOND                            0.3566  (2.836) 
 
     B. With Demand Variable ASK 
 Number of observations=1260  Log likelihood=508.682  Schwarz B.I.C.=－465.849 
( investment equation )  
                          regime 1                     regime 2  
 Q                  0.1508  (7.095)              0.1047  (8.781) 
 CF                0.5688  (5.421)              0.1202  (2.279) 
 ASK                  0.0161  (2.109)             0.0146   (5.156) 
iσ                 0.2436  (34.684)            0.1185   (20.712) 
 εσ ,i               －0.0925  (5.611)            －0.0858  (8.118) 
 ex post probability     0.3769                      0.6231 
 ( switching equation ) 
  )1(−LK              0.2152  (3.154) 
 BOND                            0.2640  (2.255) 
 
Notes. ‘BOND’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has 
issued bonds in the past, ‘ex post probability’ refers to the 
estimate of the ex post probability that each observation falls 
into Regime 1 or 2 given information on its investment value. 
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Table 6 Estimates of the Switching Regression Model  
Current Q model : ]),1([, BONDLKZ ti −=  
     A. Without Demand Variable ASK 
 Number of observations=1131  Log likelihood=391.652  Schwarz B.I.C.=－356.498 
( investment equation )  
                          regime 1                     regime 2  
 )1(−Q              0.0857  (2.232)              0.1255  (6.631) 
 CF                0.5192  (3.258)              0.0043  (0.049) 
 iσ                 0.2690  (28.169)             0.1215  (20.936) 
 εσ ,i                －0.0737 (4.036)             －0.0686  (5.791) 
 ex post probability      0.3508                      0.6492 
 ( switching equation ) 
  )1(−LK              0.2859  (3.374) 
 BOND                            0.2838  (2.044) 
 
     B. With Demand Variable ASK 
 Number of observations=1131  Log likelihood=421.711  Schwarz B.I.C.=－379.526 
( investment equation )  
                         regime 1                     regime 2  
 )1(−Q               0.0540  (1.419)              0.1052  (5.830) 
 CF               0.6287  (3.898)             －0.0286  (0.353) 
 ASK                 0.0177  (2.139)              0.0227   (7.126) 
iσ                0.2647  (28.603)             0.1167   (21.454) 
 εσ ,i               －0.0765  (4.322)            －0.0705  (6.285) 
 ex post probability     0.3522                      0.6478 
 ( switching equation ) 
  )1(−LK              0.3252  (4.128) 
 BOND                            0.2405  (1.845) 
 
Notes. ‘BOND’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has 
issued bonds in the past, ‘ex post probability’ refers to the 
estimate of the ex post probability that each observation falls 
into Regime 1 or 2 given information on its investment value. 
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